“板桥杯”青年翻译竞赛作为专业且极具品牌特色的军事翻译赛事，自2008年至今已成功举办了十四届，为社会发掘了一大批优秀的青年翻译人才。为进一步满足日益扩大的军事翻译需求，瞄准发现和储备具有国际视野的高水平、专业化新型军事翻译人才，现举办第十五届“板桥杯”青年翻译竞赛。本届大赛由江苏省翻译协会负责主办，国防科技大学国际关系学院具体承办。比赛不收取任何参赛费用。

主办：江苏省翻译协会

承办：国防科技大学国际关系学院

第十五届“板桥杯”（Bambridge）青年翻译竞赛分笔译和口译两项子赛事。具体参赛规则如下：

第一部分 笔译比赛

竞赛内容：军事、外交、政治和国际关系等题材的文章，形式为英译汉。

笔译参赛原文：参赛人员请登陆江苏省翻译协会网站下载、查看通知附件或相关微信公众号。

参赛对象：

江苏省翻译协会会员和团体会员（参赛选手需年龄40周岁以下）

译文要求：

1.参赛译文需用电脑A4纸宋体小四号打印。译文正文内请勿书写译者姓名或透露任何有关译者的个人信息。

2.参赛译文请将报名表作为封面，写清参赛者的姓名、性别、出生年月、工作（学习）单位、联系电话和地址，参赛译文需邮寄纸质版到指定地址（南京市雨花区板桥街道国际关系学院军事翻译教研室 ，郭琼（老师）收，邮编：210039）。

3.同时将译文电子稿发送至竞赛专用邮箱：guoqiong@nudt.edu.cn，主题以姓名+译文题名标注。

4.参赛译文须独立完成，杜绝抄袭现象。一经发现，将取消参赛资格。

奖项设置：笔译比赛设特等奖四名，一等奖十二名，二等奖二十名，三等奖若干名，并设优秀指导教师奖。

颁奖典礼：本届竞赛颁奖典礼将于2023年6月下旬（具体时间待通知）在国防科技大学国际关系学院教学楼军事外交模拟中心举行，笔译获奖证书将通过邮寄或邮件方式发放，获奖人员将受邀参加颁奖典礼。

截止日期：2023年4月1日（参赛译文投递截止日期以寄出邮戳为准）。

投寄（挂号）地址：南京市雨花区板桥街道国际关系学院军事翻译教研室 

郭琼（老师）收    邮编：210039

（请在信封上注明：“参赛译文”字样，只接受邮局投递和EMS。）

联系人：郭（老师）电话：13814003496

武（老师）电话：13382054161

第十五届“板桥杯”（Bambridge）青年翻译笔译竞赛参赛报名表

姓  名		性 别			年 龄
工作/学习单位					职 业
通信地址					邮 编
电话/ 手机		电子邮箱

第二部分 口译比赛

竞赛内容：

本届口译竞赛形式为对话口译（中英交替传译），参赛对象以邀请赛方式进行。

参赛对象：

江苏省翻译协会会员和团体会员（参赛选手需年龄40周岁以下）

报名要求：

1. 每所院校限报两名参赛选手，各院校负责组织本校的初选工作。

2. 拟报名参赛的选手需要在截止日期前将参赛报名表寄回，写清参赛者的姓名、性别、出生年月、工作（学习）单位、联系电话和地址。

奖项设置：口译比赛设特等奖二名，一等奖四名，二等奖六名，三等奖若干名，并设优秀指导教师奖。

比赛时间及颁奖典礼：本届口译竞赛将于2023年6月下旬（具体时间待通知）颁奖典礼之前在国防科技大学国际关系学院教学楼军事外交模拟中心举行，比赛结束后当场颁奖。

报名截止日期：2023年4月1日（投递截止日期以寄出邮戳为准）。

投寄（挂号）地址：南京市雨花区板桥街道国际关系学院国际军事合作教研室 

武媛媛（老师）收    邮编：210039

（请在信封上注明：“口译报名”字样，只接受邮局投递和EMS。）

联系人：  武（老师）电话：13382054161

第十五届“板桥杯”（Bambridge）青年翻译口译竞赛参赛报名表

姓  名		性 别			年 龄
工作/学习单位					职 业
通信地址					邮 编
电话/ 手机		电子邮箱

“板桥杯”青年笔译竞赛原文

21st-Century Combined Arms

Current events show us that the char­acter of combined arms is changing in three primary ways. First, continuing advancements in information and re­lated technologies, particularly in the areas of cyberspace, space, and influence technologies like social media, provide a widening array of capabilities that can be combined to generate advantages. Integrating these information capa­bilities with maneuver and lethal fires to present a dilemma at the right time and place is key to 21st-century com­bined arms. To illustrate the expanding use of technology, consider the near­-realtime view of the unfolding conflict in Ukraine that we have all witnessed through various media. The widespread use of social media to livestream battles was unfathomable 20 or 30 years ago, but today demonstrates the power of using information as a means of exploit­ing tactical events to mobilize public opinion and galvanize will on a national or global scale.

Second, the delivery of combined arms has changed a great deal due to the mature precision-strike regime (MPSR). Integrating this level of pre­cision into combined arms is changing how competitors and enemies approach warfighting. The proliferation of the MPSR places a premium on winning the all-domain reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance fight. The actor who wins this fight can apply combined arms, with the loser suffer­ing the consequences. Furthermore, the actor who best exploits the mas­sive amounts of data generated by the widespread proliferation of sensors gains a tremendous advantage in the recon­naissance and counter-reconnaissance fight. The side which can make sense of the data faster than the other will find and engage targets faster than the other. In this way, the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance fight, and therefore combined arms in the 21st century, presents a “big data” exploita­tion challenge.

The third change we are witnessing is the use of combined arms across the competition continuum. Understand­ing this change requires adopting an expanded concept of combined arms that makes it as applicable below the violence threshold as it is above. We see examples of this at work in places where our competitors create dilemmas against their neighbors who are allied with the United States, and where the competi­tor seeks objectives without triggering a military response from the targeted na­tion, or the United States.

If our frame for understanding 20th-century combined arms involved com­bining supporting arms, organic fires, and maneuver, then our frame for 21st-century combined arms should involve combining supporting arms, organic fires, maneuver, and information. Infor­mation is added as a component of 21st-century combined arms because it under­pins many of the changes underway in broader society, the global security envi­ronment, and in the Marine Corps. The digital transformation of our networked society and Marine Corps is character­ized by hyper-connectivity, mass data storage and computational power, and the fusion and correlation of data to drive outcomes. These information­-based changes introduce vulnerabilities and opportunities that were not possible in previous decades. In response to this new reality the Marine Corps established the information warfighting function to formalize an approach to leveraging the power of information in campaigning, operations, and combined arms. Through combined arms, Marines integrate the functions of information, and associated capabilities, with fires and maneuver to create no-win situations for our com­petitors and enemies.

A key feature of the refined model of 21st-century combined arms is the con­cept of information fires and informa­tion maneuver. An example of information fires is conducting a cyberspace or elec­tromagnetic attack to deceive the enemy or destroy the enemy s critical systems. An example of information maneuver is altering, suppressing, or manipulating electronic, digital, or physical signatures to deceive the enemy, reveal or conceal a capability or movement, or to slow the enemy’s decision making.

The MEU is well trained and equipped to perform 21st-century combined arms. To illustrate how the MEU can perform 21st-century com­bined arms, consider a hypothetical MEU mission to strike and eliminate a high-value individual (HVI) (e.g., key leader, technical expert, financier) within a violent extremist organization (VEO). In this scenario, the MEU cre­ates a combined arms dilemma by using one capability to deny the HVI use of a critical asset, another to track the HVI, and yet another to strike and eliminate the HVI when the individual attempts to access, use, or repair the asset. This technique of “herding” individuals to a specific location to address a problem exposes them to physical harm.

In this example, the MEU--working under the authority of the combatant commander, and in concert with ap­plicable intelligence agencies and the Department of State--is assigned the mission to disrupt a VEO’s online me­dia operations. The VEO’s core lead­ership group is located in a relatively small and geographically isolated area within the MEU’s reach. However, its media operations, to include its pro­paganda and recruitment efforts, are highly sophisticated and effective at projecting an outsized image through a global online presence. This presence has proved effective at increasing the groups support, funding, and influence, and thus represents a growing threat.

For this mission, the MEU receives intelligence on the physical locations of the VEO’s media production stu­dio, primary server, and backup server. These three assets are located in two separate buildings approximately three miles apart. At the designated time, the MEU’s cyber planner coordinated with USCYBERCOM, through the geographic combatant commander, to initiate the pre-planned denial of service attack (a form of information fires) against the VEO’s servers. At the same time, the MEU’s psychological operations detachment delivers tailored messages via cell phone (a form of infor­mation maneuver) to the VEO’s chief of media operations (the HVI). These carefully crafted, pre-approved messages are consistent with the HVI’s language, culture, and current events in the local area. This makes the HVI unsuspecting when notified of the malfunctioning servers.

As the cyber-attack and deceptive messaging occur, MEU reconnaissance teams occupy positions to observe and report on all relevant activity at the two locations. A cascade of rapidly unfold­ing events is triggered when the HVI arrives at the primary site to investigate the server issue. These events begin with the reconnaissance report notifying the MEU commander of the HVI’s arrival. The commander’s decision to strike un­leashes two orbiting F-35’s waiting to deliver ordinance on both locations. The no-win situation created by this scenario is either accepting disrupted media operations or attempting to repair and suffer physical harm and destruc­tion. The strike results in eliminating the HVI, several support personnel, and destroys the buildings housing the stu­dio and both servers.

 

To compete and fight effectively in the 21st century the Marine Corps must adapt to the evolving security environ­ment by applying a modern approach to 21st-century combined arms. The combined arms approach is how the Marine Corps executes maneuver war­fare. Rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver can only be accomplished by a combined arms force and through a diversity of means that maximizes com­bat power, flexibility, and responsive­ness.